Aug Concentration: Ownership Top-1 ~63% (CN Funds) — Core Package Top-1 Still 71% US

Our H-NIPO research ledger mapped the stock: jurisdictions using trade-distorting subsidies nearly doubled from 36% to 59%, and China, the EU, and the United States together account for roughly 53% of the historical tape. The Q3 concentration print then answered the distribution question with package-dollar HHI near 5,320 and IRA TE alone ~83% of the US rollup. The August 202608 toolkit update added May–Jul monthly flow and a disclosed 2025 instrument mix. This August concentration lens asks the same core question desks actually trade — how concentrated is this system at the top of the distribution? — and folds ownership stakes, Korea mega-plan sensitivity, and the May→Jul flow path into the meter.

The dashboard above is built as a four-view concentration toolkit. Toggle HHI radar, Package ladders, Ownership stakes, and Flow path. The punchline is deliberately multi-sided. On Jun–Jul ownership / equity stakes, China subnational funds alone are about 63% of a ~$5.2B tracked tape and the top three deals clear roughly 90%. On core fiscal-package dollars, concentration remains extreme: analytical HHI ≈ 5,320, the United States alone is about 71% of the CHIPS/IRA/EU/CN/JP/KR war-chest universe, and the same Big Three clear roughly 93%. Flip the package universe to include Korea’s ~$951B mega-plan headline and top-1 flips to Korea near 60%. On intervention counts, the top is thick but not monopolistic: top-1 near 24%, top-3 near 63%. Monthly flow sits flatter still — June’s Roundup still leaves 62% to the rest of the world even as July volume jumps +25% versus May.

The August headline ladder: top-1, top-3, and HHI

Read the table as a family of market shares, not one number. Count-based top-3 sits in a 48–63% band depending on vintage. Dollar-based top-3 among large packages sits near 93% in the core universe — or near 89% once Korea’s mega-plan is admitted as a sensitivity. Ownership concentration sits between those extremes. Flow-based top-3 in a single busy month can fall to 38%. Analysts who quote only the Big Three stock share understate how dollarised US packages and China equity funds dominate fiscal and ownership capacity; analysts who quote only IRA or Korea headlines understate how many capitals still generate the daily intervention count.

HHI radar: six lenses, six industrial-organisation objects

Open HHI radar. The horizontal bars rank analytical Herfindahl indexes on the stated bucket shares. Core package dollars clear the field near 5,320. Ownership stakes sit next near 4,470 — a five-deal ledger where one China subnational fund cluster is already 63%. The Korea mega-plan sensitivity softens package HHI to about 4,280 even while flipping the top-1 label. The disclosed 2025 toolkit mix prints a mid-range HHI near 2,550 because import barriers (27%), domestic subsidies (26%), finance/FDI controls (23%), and export/other (24%) are nearly level. Stock counts sit near 1,846. June flow drops under 1,000 once rest-of-world’s 62% share is in the mix.

That ordering is the August contribution relative to a simple top-3 quote. Top-3 shares can look “similar” across lenses when they are not. A top-3 of 63% on counts and 93% on packages both sound concentrated in prose; the HHI meter shows they are different markets. The scatter next to the bars plots each lens by top-1 (x) and top-3 (y): core packages and ownership sit in the upper-right; June flow sits lower-left; toolkit mix and stock counts occupy the middle.

Ownership stakes: the August dollar ladder nobody quoted as “market share”

Switch to Ownership stakes. The Jun–Jul Roundup equity tape is small in absolute dollars next to IRA TE, but it is the cleanest new concentration object the August vintage adds. China subnational equity funds (~$3.3B, five governments) are about 63% of the tracked ~$5.2B universe. US CHIPS equity LOIs (~$874M across seven firms) are about 17%. SandboxAQ’s CHIPS stake (~$500M) adds another 10%. Top-3 deals therefore clear roughly 90%.

This is how industrial policy reshapes ownership geography without requiring a statutory appropriation headline. Equity LOIs and subnational funds concentrate control claims even when monthly intervention counts look diversified. The Lorenz curve on this view shows how far the ownership ladder sits above an equal five-way split — and why desks that only watch CHIPS appropriations miss the China fund peak that dominates the summer stake tape.

Treat the ownership universe as a Roundup sample, not a global M&A census. Missing deals would change shares; the qualitative story — one China fund cluster as top-1 — is robust to modest omissions at the thin end of the ladder.

Dollar packages: war chests, and the Korea sensitivity that flips top-1

Open Package ladders and leave the universe on Core war chest. Among the major semiconductor and clean-tech fiscal headlines we roll up — US IRA clean-energy tax expenditures (~$370B original score), US CHIPS appropriations ($52.7B) and ITC (~$24B), EU Chips mobilisation (~$47B), EU IPCEI state aid (~$40B), China’s Big Fund III (~$48B), plus Japan and Korea semiconductor envelopes — the United States alone is ~71% of the dollar universe and the top three jurisdictions clear ~93%.

Toggle + Korea mega-plan. The alternate universe adds the disclosed ~$951B industrial mega-plan headline and expands the pie to about $1.58T. Top-1 flips to Korea near 60%; the US falls to roughly 28%; top-3 still clears near 89%. Package HHI softens from ~5,320 to ~4,280 — still extreme, but a different story about which capital sits at the tip of the distribution.

That sensitivity is methodological as much as empirical. Korea’s mega-plan is not dollar-for-dollar comparable to IRA tax-expenditure scores or CHIPS appropriations. Including it answers a different question: what happens to “market share” narratives when one outsized announced envelope enters the war-chest ledger. Excluding it preserves comparability with the Q3 concentration print. Both meters belong on the desk; neither should be quoted without naming the universe.

Stock counts and vintage slope: the top is thick, not monopolistic

On cumulative intervention counts, China / US / EU still sum to the disclosed Teneo Big Three share of 63%, with an estimated top-1 near 24% (China-led) and stock HHI ≈ 1,846. That is concentrated relative to an equal six-way split. It is not a winner-take-all market. A system where the top three hold three-fifths of recorded interventions still leaves a long tail of capitals that can start subsidy races, copy HS6 product lists, or free-ride on templates written in Washington, Brussels, and Beijing.

IMF’s H-NIPO check sits a notch lower — China+EU+US at 53% of the 2009–2023 stock — and the 2023 census alone put the same trio at about 48% of 2,580 measures. The vintage slope on the Package ladders view shows why a single “concentration is rising” slogan fails: census intensity, cumulative stock coding, and monthly flow geography are different instruments. Toggle to Top-1 % and the slope flattens further — estimated top-1 shares cluster near 18–24% on count vintages and 20% on June flow, while package-dollar and ownership top-1 live on a different chart entirely.

Flow path: volume up, geography still RoW-heavy

Open Flow path. May→Jul GTA Roundup totals rise from 804 to 823 to 1,008 developments — a +25% jump from May to July. Only June discloses a clean Big Three versus rest-of-world split: US 20%, EU 12%, China 6%, rest-of-world 62%. That is the flattest concentration print in the August toolkit, and it warns against equating stock concentration with flow concentration. Rest-of-world can still dominate a month’s tape even when the cumulative ledger and the ownership stake ladder are top-heavy.

The June pie is therefore a flow check, not a substitute for multi-year stock. July’s louder volume without a matching geography disclosure is itself a data warning: rising intervention intensity does not automatically imply rising Big Three share.

Toolkit mix and strategic intensity still reshape the top

Concentration is not only who intervenes; it is what they intervene with. The HHI view’s toolkit donut restates the August update’s instrument punchline: import barriers (27%), domestic subsidies (26%), and finance/FDI controls (23%) are nearly co-equal in the 2025 distortive mix — a sharp break from older subsidy-monopoly intuitions. The US alone still accounts for roughly 20% of 2025 import-barrier actions inside that barrier slice. The strategic panel restates ZG #88: China’s dual-use / advanced-tech subsidy share sits near 98%, the US near 76%, and the EU near 70%.

That combination — concentrated ownership stakes, concentrated core fiscal packages, thick but not monopolistic intervention counts, strategic targeting converging upward inside the Big Three, and a more balanced toolkit — is how subsidies, tariffs, and industrial policy reshape economies at the top of the distribution without requiring a single global monopoly capital.

Caveats

• Individual China / US / EU count splits inside the Teneo Big Three 63% are estimated so the ladder sums; treat top-1 stock (~24%) as order-of-magnitude, not a census microdata print.
• Package USD figures mix appropriations, mobilisation targets, state-aid approvals, fund raises, and tax-credit scoresnot outlays-to-date and not dollar-for-dollar comparable.
• Korea mega-plan (~$951B) is a disclosed headline used only in the alternate universe; do not splice it into IRA/CHIPS comparability without naming the sensitivity.
• Ownership stakes are a Jun–Jul Roundup sample (~$5.2B), not a global equity-as-IP census; missing deals would move shares.
• HHI values are analytical indexes on the stated bucket shares, not official competition-authority statistics; changing the bucket set changes the index.
• June 2026 flow is one month’s Roundup geographyuseful as a flow check, not a substitute for multi-year stock; July volume lacks a matching geography split.
• Strategic intensity shares are percent of subsidy-based IP actions, not percent of dollars.
• Toolkit instrument mix is the disclosed 2025 Teneo Fig.2 cross-section; export/other is the residual that closes the pie.

The shareable takeaway

Fiscal and industrial policy is concentrated at the top — but which top depends on the meter. On Jun–Jul ownership stakes, China subnational funds alone are about 63% and top-3 deals about 90%. Among core war-chest headlines, package-dollar HHI is about 5,320, US top-1 about 71%, and Big Three about 93% — until a Korea mega-plan sensitivity flips top-1 near 60%. On cumulative intervention counts, top-1 is about 24% and top-3 about 63%. On June’s monthly tape, top-3 falls to 38% with rest-of-world still at 62%, even as July volume jumps +25% versus May. Subsidies, tariffs, and industrial policy reshape economies through a system that looks diversified in country counts and top-heavy once you rank dollars, ownership stakes, and strategic intensity.

Related reading: Q3 concentration · Concentration 2026 · H-NIPO research · August toolkit update.